











fforts to strengthen the international finan-
cial architecture have been underway now
for nearly three years.1 It is a game that any num-
ber can play. I like to divide the players into the
realists and the romantics.The romantics have ide-
alized – that is to say, romantic – views of how the
international financial institutions should be
reformed.Martin Feldstein is a romantic.He would
like to see the International Monetary Fund down-
sized and refocused on its core competence, name-
ly, giving advice on monetary, fiscal and exchange-
rate policies.2 The Fund, in his view, has a mandate
to pursue macroeconomic and currency stabiliza-
tion and should concentrate on providing macro-
economic policy advice. It is not and should not be
in the business of fighting corruption, alleviating
poverty, reforming political institutions, remaking
financial markets along Anglo-Saxon lines, or
changing the way countries govern their corpora-
tions. To the extent that institution building and
poverty reduction are goals to which the interna-
tional financial institutions can in fact contribute,
they are properly the province of the World Bank,
not the IMF.
It would be nice were it possible for the IMF to
limit its attention to monetary, fiscal and exchange
rate policies and to disregard poverty, distribution
and politics. But the only policies that work are
policies that stick. If recommendations are not
embraced by the governments to whom they are
offered, they will not restore confidence. If they
impose unfair burdens on a part of the population,
they will incite a political backlash. If they have
socially unacceptable distributional consequences,
they will end up undermining both public support
for the government and the social consensus for
reform.
It follows that the IMF must worry about the polit-
ical sustainability of the policies it recommends.
This in turn implies that it has to be sensitive to the
consequences for poverty, for the distribution of
income, and for political stability.Admittedly, even
those of us who accept this position are more than
a bit uncomfortable with its implications. We
appreciate that IMF staff and management are
expert in economic theory and policy, not political
science. But economic advice which ignores politi-
cal realities is bad advice. Among the most impor-
tant respects in which the world today differs from
the world of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s is that it is
more democratic.Country after country has moved
away from authoritarian politics toward more
democratic political systems,and admirably so.But
we must recognize that this makes the goals of the
IMF that much more difficult to achieve. The
money doctor’s medicine can no longer be forced
down the throat of a reluctant patient. And
acknowledgment of this fact is subversive to the
idea that concern with poverty, distribution, and
politics is incidental to the IMF’s mandate.
Moreover, it is essential to acknowledge that an
institution that was established to assume respon-
sibility for the stabilization of exchange rates has
inevitably acquired a very different set of responsi-
bilities. In 1944, when the IMF was founded, inter-
national financial markets were demoralized, con-
trolled, and suppressed. International economic
stability was synonymous with exchange rate sta-
bility, reflecting memories of exchange-rate tur-
moil in the 1930s and the infinitely more destruc-
tive conflicts that followed.Today’s IMF is a differ-
ent animal, not just because the Bretton Woods
System of pegged-but-adjustable exchange rates
that provided its original mandate is no more but
E
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REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARCHITECTUREbecause of the exponential growth of international
financial flows.In the wake of World War II,a peri-
od of pervasive controls on international capital
movements and tight domestic financial regula-
tion, international economic stability was synony-
mous with macroeconomic stability and, more
specifically,with exchange rate stability.Now,when
they invoke the concept of international economic
stability, most observers appropriately mean finan-
cial stability. Financial transactions, international
financial transactions in particular, are back. The
principal threat to the stability of national
economies and to the world as a whole is financial
crises, not simple changes in exchange rates. The
IMF has consequently become the point man in
the global effort to prevent and contain financial
crises, for reasons whose logic is too compelling to
deny.
Once one acknowledges this fact, it becomes
impossible to accept the idea,however appealing it
may be to the instincts of those skeptical of the
motives and efficiency of large bureaucracies, that
IMF surveillance and conditionality should be lim-
ited to monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies.
Because it is in the business of ensuring financial
stability, and because the structure and regulation
of financial markets are key determinants of finan-
cial stability, the Fund has no choice but to worry
about auditing and accounting,financial disclosure,
connected lending, prudential supervision and reg-
ulation, insurance market regulation, bankruptcy
and insolvency procedures, shareholder rights and
corporate governance. The single most important
lesson of the Asian crisis is that international
financial stability requires domestic financial sta-
bility. Given the speed with which financial prob-
lems spill across borders, international financial
stability can be jeopardized by weak policies and
institutions in a single country in the same way that
the stability of a national financial system can be
jeopardized by problems in a single bank (if the
latter is big enough).And domestic financial stabil-
ity requires upgrading national practice in all the
aforementioned areas. Hence, the IMF, which has a
mandate to promote international financial stabili-
ty, cannot and should not avoid concerning itself
with the domestic financial arrangements of its
member countries. It is inevitable, then, that the
institution should be led into surveillance of these
areas and that it should attach conditions relating
to them to its loans.
This agenda is not unproblematic. Most obviously,
the IMF lacks the resources to monitor every
aspect of economic structure and regulation rele-
vant to the stability of financial markets. It thus
needs to attach priority to monitoring those poli-
cies and arrangements that are most intimately
connected to financial stability – and to figure out
how to give operational content to this unobjec-
tionable platitude. The reform of bankruptcy and
insolvency procedures, for example, holds out
more promise for strengthening creditor rights,
market discipline and financial stability than
breaking up Indonesia’s clove monopoly. Similarly,
however admirable are poverty eradication and an
equitable distribution of income as social goals,
conditioning IMF assistance on measures to
address poverty and income distribution is justified
only if the case is made that such measures are
essential to the political sustainability of reforms
required for the restoration of financial stability.
Second, there is the problem of limited compe-
tence,since the Fund lacks staff possessing the spe-
cialized skills of accountants, bank supervisors, and
securities market regulators. Some of these it can
find in its sister institution across the street and in
other public agencies. Others it can beg, borrow
and steal from the private sector. A successful
experiment along these lines is the IMF and World
Bank’s newly-created Financial Sector Assessment
Programs, in which Fund and Bank staff, together
with experts from national central banks, supervi-
sory agencies and private-sector organizations on
secondment, undertake systematic assessments of
the implications for stability of the organization
and regulation of national financial systems.This is
the approach being taken to gathering and analyz-
ing the information needed for the Reports on the
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) that
the IMF now proposes to issue for its members.
Third, there is the danger that the Fund will give
one-size-fits-all advice, destroying the biodiversity
of the „genetic pool“ of diverse national practice.
International bureaucrats situated in Washington,
D.C. inevitably know less about the distinctive cir-
cumstances of 182 national economies than locals
who encounter those circumstances every day.
Hence, advice regarding institutional design, if it
comes down from above, may fail to take advan-
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that the Fund will recommend institutional
arrangements ill suited to local circumstances.
The solution is to rely on international standards
for national practice in areas related to the organi-
zation and regulation of financial markets, which
define minimally acceptable practice while allow-
ing countries to meet those standards in ways that
accommodate the diversity of national economic,
political and historical circumstances. Govern-
ments that believe in the existence of a distinctive
Asian model of high debt gearing and bank-cen-
tered lending,for example,should be given the lee-
way to develop and regulate their financial mar-
kets in a manner consistent with that model. The
only consideration relevant to the IMF should be
whether those national practices are consistent
with financial stability. In the context of the Asian
model this means strengthening market discipline
by limiting explicit and implicit guarantees for
financial institutions and mandating the prompt
public disclosure of financial information by banks
and corporations.
The implication is that the IMF’s new focus on
standards and codes is not a departure from its
core competence or a manifestation of mission
creep. Rather, it is central to the mandate of the
institution in the 21st century.
The obstacles to be surmounted should not be
underestimated. The Fund and the multilaterals
generally lack the expertise and resources to
devise financial standards in all the relevant areas.
They must rely, as they have begun to do, on spe-
cialized bodies like the International Accounting
Standards Committee, the International Fed-
eration of Accountants, and the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors, and serve as
ex officio members of their standard-setting com-
mittees. They must encourage these bodies to
expand the representation of emerging markets,
who are prominent among the countries to which
the resulting standards will be applied.Rather than
objecting to the entire standard-setting agenda, as
the Group of 24 developing countries did in a com-
munique issued during the recent Bank-Fund
meetings, emerging markets will then have an
incentive to take “ownership” of the resulting
guidelines.
In addition, there is a reluctance to issue blunt
assessments of the adequacy of national practice.
The ROSCs issued to date by the Fund mince too
many words to be effective. If the markets are to
going to key the price of credit to IMF assessments
of whether or not national practice in these areas
meets the international norm, then the Fund’s
evaluations will have to be less opaque.
The consistency and effectiveness of market disci-
pline being uncertain, there is still the need for the
official sector to provide its own incentives for gov-
ernments and countries to meet the standards it
sets. Unfortunately, it is unclear what incentives
the official community is prepared to offer. There
is a recognition of the desirability of keying the
capital weights applied by regulators to interna-
tional bank lending to whether the borrowing
country meets the relevant standards and codes
but no concrete agreement on reforming the Basle
Capital Accord.There is general agreement on the
desirability of conditioning access to certain IMF
facilities on countries’ conformance to those stan-
dards but again no concrete agreement on how to
proceed.
Ultimately, the international community will have
to reject the notion that the IMF can simply “get
back to basics” and concentrate on giving mone-
tary, fiscal and exchange-rate advice. The desire of
the romantics for a “focused Fund” with a clear
sense of priorities, that is cognizant of its own limit-
ed capacities and of the autonomy of its 182 mem-
bers, is understandable, even admirable. But in a
financially-integrated world, the focus needs to be
on financial stability, not just monetary, fiscal and
exchange rate policies.Ineluctably,the Fund will be
led to confront the complex reality in which much
more matters than simply its traditional concerns
centering on macroeconomic policy. The inaugural
speech at September’s Prague meetings by the
IMF’s new managing director, Horst Koehler
(Koehler 2000), betrayed this fact. While repeating
his now familiar mantra of the need to “refocus ...
to prioritize and concentrate on implementation,”
Koehler then enumerated a long list of essential
measures necessary to make the world a safer
financial place.The conclusion is unavoidable.
Another set of romantics are the members of the
Meltzer Commission, which reported to the U.S.
Congress and Treasury on reform of the interna-
tional financial institutions.4 The commission’s
4 See International Financial Institution Advisory Commission
(2000).report concludes that the IMF should lend only to
countries with fundamentally strong policies expe-
riencing financial difficulties for reasons not of
their own making (investor panic, for example, or
the spillover from crises in other countries). The
Fund should identify eligible countries, if possible
in advance. It should lend to them without attach-
ing detailed policy conditions,at high interest rates,
for limited periods. Because the country’s policies
are fundamentally sound, no reforms are required
in any case. And if a country that does not qualify
for assistance, because for example it had failed to
adequately supervise and regulate its banking sys-
tem, experiences a crisis, then the Fund should
stand aside and let it meet its fate (which would
typically take the form of having to suspend pay-
ments on external debts, devalue its currency, and
undertake restructuring negotiations with its cred-
itors).
Distinguishing countries with sound and unsound
policies is not easy. But if IMF loans are extended
at penalty rates, the Meltzer Report reasons, and if
the Fund’s claims are effectively senior to the bor-
rower’s other liabilities, then countries can be
relied on to sort themselves.Those with fundamen-
tally sound policies but a temporary liquidity prob-
lem would still want to borrow in order to ride out
the storm, while countries with deep policy prob-
lems would recognize that doing so would only
compound their difficulties (by superimposing
additional debts bearing high interest rates on an
already difficult fiscal position), temporarily put
off the day of reckoning (because IMF loans would
have to be paid back in short order), and antago-
nize existing investors (since their claims would be
subordinated by the government’s obligations to
the IMF).
The appeal of this approach is obvious.The exten-
sion of international financial assistance in times of
crisis would be routinized. The discretion pos-
sessed by the IMF would be removed. It would not
be necessary to attach onerous conditions to the
institution’s loans, since assistance would be pro-
vided only to countries where macroeconomic pol-
icy and prudential supervision were already strong.
Moral hazard would be reduced, market discipline
strengthened. Liquidity crises would disappear. It
is not surprising that these arguments have struck
a cord. Even before the Meltzer Report was writ-
ten, the IMF’s First Deputy Managing Director,
Stanley Fischer, was asking whether the Fund
should take on the mantle of an international
lender of last resort. In response to the report, U.S.
Treasury Secretary Summers advocated a reduc-
tion in the term of IMF loans and an increase in
their cost, a recommendation adopted by the IMF
Board, in modified form, last September.
However appealing these ideas are in principle,
operationalizing them is easier said than done.
Does a government have only liquidity problems
or something more – policy problems that need to
be fixed – when there is no technical obstacle to
raising taxes or cutting public spending, thereby
mobilizing the requisite resources for debt service,
but there is political resistance to doing so? How
bad do its policies have to be before it is placed in
the category of cases that the IMF will not help?
And which policies should be emphasized in this
determination? Some countries experience crises
because they have poorly regulated banking sys-
tems,as the Meltzer Commission emphasized when
it honed in on the adequacy of prudential supervi-
sion as a key determinant of whether restoring sta-
bility required fundamental policy reform or the
simple provision of liquidity. But other countries
experience crises for other reasons, as the commis-
sion ultimately acknowledged: reckless monetary
policies, inconsistent exchange rate policies, and
unsustainable budget deficits are among the fac-
tors that spring to mind.This acknowledgment puts
paid to the idea that detailed surveillance of policy
can be superseded by simple lending rules.
More generally, the notion of prequalifying coun-
tries for IMF assistance, which will then be dis-
bursed without additional conditions,is problemat-
ic. The Contingent Credit Line (CCL) established
by the Fund in the aftermath of the Asian crisis is
an attempt to move in the direction of more pre-
qualification and less ex post conditionality. In
practice, the CCL has been less than a stunning
success, given the reluctance of countries to apply.
The reasons are not hard to see. If the Fund pre-
qualifies a country because its policies are good,
then it will have to un-prequalify it if those policies
deteriorate. (Otherwise moral hazard returns with
a vengeance.) Un-prequalifying a previously pre-
qualified country runs the risk of precipitating a
crisis. Knowing this, the Fund is forced to establish
a high hurdle for prequalification or hold out the
option of reconsidering whether the country still
qualifies when it asks to draw. Moreover, countries












already done so for fear of signaling that they
anticipate problems. The IMF, following the U.S.
Treasury’s lead, sought in September to make the
CCL more attractive by eliminating the commit-
ment fee and reducing the differential interest sur-
charge. It simplified the conditions that a previous-
ly prequalified country has to meet when it seeks
to draw. The present perspective suggests that
these limited changes are unlikely to make the
CCL wildly attractive.
Most fundamentally, the notion that the IMF can
simply stand aside if a country with deep domestic
problems experiences a crisis flies in the face of
common sense and historical experience.If a coun-
try’s problems go beyond a temporary loss of
investor confidence, the romantics argue, then it
should be left to restructure its debts. Providing it
with liquidity assistance, which it will then use to
pay off its foreign creditors, will only delay the
inevitable while letting investors off the hook and
aggravating investor moral hazard.
But there are good reasons why restructuring is
rare and bailouts are frequent. Bonds issued in the
United States typically lack any provision for a
bondholders assembly, a deed trustee to act as a
communications center for the creditors, sharing
clauses, and majority-voting clauses. Because each
and every bondholder must agree to the terms of a
restructuring, vulture investors can threaten litiga-
tion and hold up the process. Restructuring should
not be too easy, of course, or debtors would be
tempted to walk away from their debts, creating
moral hazard for the borrower.5 But the frequency
of IMF rescues in the 1990s suggests that the bal-
ance of risks has shifted in the other direction, to
ever more frequent IMF bailouts, extended in
response to the difficulty of debt restructuring,and
investor, not borrower, moral hazard.
If the problem is well known, then so is the solu-
tion: adding collective action clauses (which would
specify who represents the bondholders, provide a
communications center, and add majority voting
and sharing rules) to bond covenants. The IMF
could then credibly commit to stand aside if a
country with deep policy problems experienced a
crisis, requiring it to restructure its debts.
Advocating that the Fund stand back without cre-
ating an alternative way of resolving financial
crises is to assume a solution to the problem where
none exists.For those who take seriously the moral
hazard created by IMF rescues, this is an essential
reform.
Here is where both governments and experts have
dropped the ball.While the official community has
mouthed the right words about the desirability of
collective action clauses, it has done little to
encourage their adoption. The U.S. Treasury, con-
cerned to retain the good graces of the bond mar-
ket, is reluctant to do anything that might unsettle
investors. The IMF’s great innovation has been to
establish a Capital Markets Consultative Group
for fostering regular dialogue with the private sec-
tor.6Another talk shop cannot hurt,but this is a far
cry from an institutional mechanism to concert the
creditors. While the Meltzer Commission recom-
mended strict limits on IMF lending, it did not
embrace the idea of collective action clauses.7 But
without specific recommendations in this area, the
commission’s other suggestions will go nowhere.
The pressure for IMF rescues in the event of crises
will diminish only when alternative mechanisms
are developed for resolving the latter.
From this point of view, it is no coincidence that
the changes in lending terms and conditions
agreed to by the IMF Board in September are less
than meet the eye. Does anyone really believe
that cutting the term of IMF standby loans by a
year from the current term of 31/4 to 5 years, and
of extended fund facilities from 10 to seven years,
will really alter behavior? Do we really think that
modest increases in IMF interest charges will dis-
courage borrowing by a government desperate to
survive until the next election? The members of
the Meltzer Commission will complain that offi-
cials lacked the guts to implement their more rad-
ical recommendations, like curtailing IMF loans
to 120 days with a maximum of one renewal and
raising interest rates even more sharply. But why
more ambitious steps have not been taken is no
mystery. IMF lending can be limited only if other
ways are devised for responding to crises. And
there has been a reluctance to address this issue
head on.
5 A point that is emphasized by Friedman (2000).
6 Koehler (2000), p. 5.
7 As one member put it, „We struggled with these questions, heard
testimony, and debated at length what might be done. I think it is
fair to say that it was not clear whether existing mechanisms, and
the ongoing improvements to them that were reported at our hear-
ings, could be improved by some sort of interventions or mandates
on the part of the multilateral institutions. In the interest of ‘doing
no harm’ the Commission did not make specific recommendations
in this area.“ Calomiris (2000b), p. 4.The official community deserves a passing grade,
even a good one, for its efforts on the crisis-preven-
tion front. By comparison, attempts to date to
reform and improve the way we respond to crises
must be judged a failure.This contrast is suggestive
of where the efforts and attention of the interna-
tional community should be focused going forward.
References
Calomiris, Charles W. (2000), “Statement Presented to the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the United
States Senate”, revised, 10 March, http://ww.senate.gov.
Feldstein, Martin (1998),“Refocusing the IMF,” Foreign Affairs 77,
pp.20–33.
Fischer, Stanley (1999), “On the Need for an International Lender
of Last Resort” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13, pp.85–104.
Friedman,Benjamin (2000),“How Easy Should Debt Restructuring
Be?” in Charles Adams, Robert Litan and Michael Pomerleano
(eds), Managing Financial and Coporate Distress: Lessons from
Asia, Washington, D.C.:The Brookings Institution, pp.21–46.
International Financial Institution Advisory Commission (2000),
Report,Washington, D.C.: IFIAC.
Koehler, Horst (2000), “Address by Horst Koehler, chairman of the
Executive Board and Managing Director of the International Mon-
etary Fund to the Board of Governors of the Fund,” Prague, 26
September,http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2000/092600.htm.
Rodrik, Dani (1999), “Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What




IMF lending can be
limited only if alter-
natives are devised
for responding to
crises